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This  paper  measures  and  compares  fragmentation  in  aid  sectors.  Past  studies 
focused on aggregate country data but a sector analysis provides a better picture of 
fragmentation. We start by counting the number of aid projects in the developing 
world  and  find  that,  in  2007,  more  than  90 000  projects  were  running 
simultaneously. Project proliferation is on a steep upward trend and will certainly 
be  reinforced  by  the  emergence  of  new  donors.  Developing  countries  with  the 
largest numbers of aid projects have more than 2 000 in a single year. In parallel to 
this boom of aid projects, there has been a major shift towards social sectors and, as 
a consequence, these are the most fragmented. We quantify fragmentation in each 
aid  sector  for  donors  and  recipients  and  identify  which  exhibit  the  highest 
fragmentation. While fragmentation is usually seen as an issue when it is excessive, 
we also show that some countries suffer from too little fragmentation. An original 
contribution of this paper is to develop a monopoly index that identifies countries 
where a donor enjoys monopoly power. Finally, we characterise countries with high 
fragmentation  levels.  Countries  that  are  poor,  democratic  and  have  a  large 
population  get  more  fragmented  aid.  However,  this  is  only  because  poor  and 
democratic countries attract more donors. Once we control for the number of donors 
in  a  country-sector,  democratic  countries  do  not  appear  different  from  non-
democratic  ones  in  any  sector  and  poor  countries  actually  have  a  slightly  less 
fragmented aid allocation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The  world  of  official  development  assistance  is  rapidly  evolving.  It  has  been  on  an 
expansion path now for half a century, with today a plethora of actors working in the same 
countries and in the same sectors. In the remote past, developed countries used to grant money 
to a few carefully picked countries, often current or former colonies, or strategic political and 
economic partners. In this perspective, aid was a tiny club affair, reserved to a small number of 
partnerships,  and  global  quantities  were  quite limited  and  concentrated.  But  in  the  last  four 
decades,  aid partnerships boomed, new bilateral and multilateral donors have emerged and this 
trend is still ongoing today with emerging countries that evolve from being aid recipients to aid 
donors (Brazil, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia or Venezuela) (see Woods, 2008).  
The issue is even more complicated when we go within each specific country because 
many old and new donors have more than one agency giving aid. Brainard (2007) estimated that 
the United States for example, the largest bilateral donor and dominant player, had more than 50 
bureaucracies by the mid 2000s involved in aid giving. The major aid unit in the US is the aid 
agency USAID but according to Oxfam only 45% of total US foreign aid is overseen by this 
agency
1. All in all, US foreign assistance programs are fragmented across 12 d epartments, 25 
different agencies and nearly 60 government offices
2. 
As underlined by Kharas (2007a and 2007b) not only are new sovereign donors emerging 
but traditional donors are also splintering into many speciali sed agencies while the number of 
private nonprofits is exploding. This new reality of aid amplifies the pressing need and search 
for more aid efficiency
3. With the multiplication of actors on the aid stage, disbursements have 
started to become more fragmented: aid is received in many small pieces from many donors. Frot 
and Santiso (2008), in a large comparative analysis of aid fragmentation, showed that if in 1960 
the average OECD donor disbursed aid each year to an average of 20 countries, in 2006 it did so 
to more than 100. Frot (2009) analysed the process of fragmentation and underlined that donors 
gave aid to rising numbers of countries but did not increase their aid budget at the same rate. 
Donors established new partnerships but allocated them small aid quantities, thereby adding to 
fragmentation. This simple observation is at the core of aid fragmentation, a now prominent 
issue in the aid community.  
Donors themselves, both bilateral and multilateral, mobili se principles and actions in 
order to reduce fragmentation and increase coordination. The Paris Declaration, signed in 2005 
by most developed and developing countries, explicitly makes coordination one of its goals. The 
Accra Agenda for Action, designed in 2008, reaffirmed the goal of a ‚more effective division of 
labour‛ and enacted a set of international good practice principles on in-country division of 
                                                       
1   See http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/Aidarchitecture-4.pdf. 
2   See  Duncan  Green’s  blog,  the  Head  of  Research  of  Oxfam  in  the  UK: 
http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=266 
3   Of course aid efficiency is a multi-dimensional problem, of which fragmentation is only one dimension. 
Propositions towards more efficiency are numerous. Birdsall (2005), Borensztein et al. (2008), Kharas 
(2007b),  among  others,  present  many  issues  about  aid  allocation  that  have  a  direct  effect  on  aid 
efficiency. 3 
 
labour.  The  Development  Assistance  Committee  (DAC)  of  the  OECD  is  actively  measuring 
progress in the implementation of these goals.  
New research has fuelled this awareness by quantifying how fragmentation has adversely 
affected aid effectiveness. Acharya et al. (2006) measured fragmentation and provided an account 
of  its  consequences.  Knack  and  Rahman  (2007)  found  that  fragmentation  decreases  the 
bureaucratic  quality  of  aid  recipients.  Djankov  et  al.  (2009)  studied  the  consequences  of 
fragmentation  and  found  that  it  makes  aid  inefficient  and  worsens  corruption.  Easterly  and 
Pfutze  (2008)  calculated  that  the  probability  that  two  randomly  selected  dollars  in  the 
international aid effort will be from the same donor to the same country for the same sector is 1 
out of nearly 2660. OECD DAC (2008) proposes new fragmentation measures at the donors’ and 
recipients’  levels  and  argues  that  fragmentation  at  the  sector  level  is  more  accurate  and 
underlines better the potentialities for labour division among donors. It motivates our approach, 
that is complementary to OECD DAC (2008). 
This paper undertakes the task of looking at sector aid data and measuring fragmentation 
in each sector, for each donor of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and for each 
recipient. Past studies looked only at aggregate data, or contained a much more limited number 
of sectors and years. A measure of fragmentation at the sector level indeed brings new benefits 
compared to existing measures. From a policy recommendation point of view, a single aggregate 
measure per country says little about potentialities for coordination among donors within the 
country. As we show in this paper, sectors are very unequal in terms of fragmentation, and 
aggregate fragmentation hides disparities. But we also find that aggregate fragmentation distorts 
the true picture by biasing upwards fragmentation levels for donors. A donor may give little aid 
to a recipient compared to other donors and so apparently contribute to fragmentation, but still 
be a major actor in a sector of the same recipient. Aggregate measures therefore oversimplify the 
issue of fragmentation by disregarding the different functions of aid, and as such miss important 
features.  
By doing a project count and by measuring aid fragmentation for donors and recipients, 
our  analysis  reveals  that  there  has  been  a  dramatic  allocation  shift  from  the  economic  and 
production sectors to the social sectors over many years. This trend, coupled with the fact that 
small-scale  social  sector  projects  are  more  prone  to  proliferation  than  heavy  infrastructure 
investments,  implies  that  social  sectors  are  the  most  fragmented  today.  Coordination  among 
donors is acutely needed in these sectors, in particular in the Education and Government & Civil 
Society sectors. 
The emphasis so far in the literature has been on the risks of too much fragmentation, but 
too little is also an issue. This paper explicitly considers this unexplored aspect of fragmentation. 
If a donor enjoys a monopoly in aid disbursements in a country, it is doubtful that aid will be 
disbursed in the most efficient fashion. Ideally one would like to have some competition, to not 
have developing countries depending on a single country for aid, but not so much competition 
that the costs of administering all the partnerships become unmanageable. To find the optimal 
number of donors for a country is a difficult task and this paper does not deal with it. However, 
we create a monopoly index to identify countries whose aid allocation is dominated by the same 
donor in each sector. We recognise that a donor enjoys monopoly power if it is dominant in 
many sectors, and not only at the aggregate level. The index therefore makes full use of the sector 4 
 
data. By designing this new index, we aim to provide as complete a picture of fragmentation as 
possible, from  too  much  to  too low fragmentation,  to  inform  donors and help  derive  policy 
recommendations. 
 Finally,  we  examine  the  characteristics  of  the  recipients  whose  aid  is  the  most 
fragmented. We uncover the relationship between fragmentation and three variables: GDP per 
capita, population and democracy. The motivation for this simple descriptive analysis is that we 
expect donors to cluster in poor, large and democratic countries, and so fragmentation to be 
correlated with these variables. We find that countries that are poorer, more democratic and with 
a larger population indeed get a more fragmented aid. However, the effects of these variables are 
quite limited and it is mostly due to the number of donors present. Once we control for the 
number of donors, we find that the level of democracy is not correlated with fragmentation. 
More democratic countries attract more donors and that is why they have higher fragmentation 
levels. 
We are not the first to measure aid fragmentation, neither at the aggregate nor at the 
sector level. Acharya et al. (2006) were among the first to do so with aggregate figures. They 
documented  the  extent  of  fragmentation  referring  to  some  anecdotal  cases,  for  instance  by 
underlining that a fairly representative aid recipient country like Vietnam had 25 official bilateral 
aid  donors  operating  in  the  early  2000s,  19  multilateral  aid  donors  and  more  than  350 
international NGOs operating all together 8 000 aid projects. They also presented measures for 
donors and recipients for the period 1999-2001. Frot and Santiso (2008) considerably extended 
the perspective by expanding the set of donors and using data from 1960 to 2006. By doing so 
they were able to follow the evolution of fragmentation and to show how it became more severe 
with time. Frot (2009) used the same data to show that a relatively limited reallocation of aid 
across  recipients  and  donors would  considerably  decrease  fragmentation  levels.  OECD  DAC 
(2008) presented its own fragmentation indexes for 2005 and was the first to initiate a sector 
analysis, looking at the health and economic infrastructure sectors. The most recent 2009 report 
from the OECD DAC (2009) uses the same figures and suggests aid disbursement has become 
even more fragmented, reducing its effectiveness. Our work uses the whole range of available 
data in all the sectors and for all the possible years. It complements past works by expanding 
their range and offers a more complete picture of aid fragmentation. Its contribution is also to 
underline that too little fragmentation is also an issue and to offer a way to identify countries and 
sectors subject to donor monopoly power.  
   5 
 
II. THE NUMBERS: SHIFTING TOWARDS SOCIAL PROJECTS 
1.  Data 
Our definition of aid is Country Programmable Aid (CPA) that includes flows that are 
defined as ODA (Official Development Assistance), but that are not classified as humanitarian 
aid, food aid, donor administrative costs, debt relief, budget support to NGOs, aid to refugees in 
donor countries and unallocated flows. Each time we refer to aid in the text, we mean CPA and 
not ODA. CPA is meant to better capture programmable development projects not motivated by 
emergency situations. It also excludes activities not located in the developing country (donor 
administrative costs, aid to refugees in the donor country) and debt relief that does not imply an 
actual cash transfer. Many authors, for instance Kharas (2007b), consider that CPA is a better 
measure of development efforts than ODA. It is also the quantity that DAC OECD uses in its 
studies of fragmentation (OECD DAC 2008). 
We exploit the Credit Reporting System (CRS) Aid Activities database of the OECD. It 
reports  a  sectoral  breakdown  of  aid  data  for  the  22  member  countries  of  the  OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), the European Commission and other international 
organisations. Countries that are non-DAC but OECD members report their aggregate, but not 
their sector aid disbursements, and so are not included in the analysis. ‚New‛ donors, such as 
Brazil, China, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia or Venezuela are becoming increasingly important and 
any study on fragmentation would greatly benefit from their inclusion. However, aid data for 
these countries is scarce and virtually non-existent at the sector level. It is a drawback not to be 
able to document how these donors contribute to fragmentation, but we must make do with this 
limitation.  If  anything,  we  believe  that  adding  more  donors  to  the  analysis  would  make 
fragmentation  even  worse  than  it  is  described  here.  Readers  should  therefore  take  numbers 
presented in this paper as a lower bound on how severe fragmentation is. 
The  CRS  database  includes  all  aid  recipients,  but  we  do  not  consider  multi/regional 
recipients (say Africa, or Asia unspecified). An aid project is defined as an entry in the CRS 
database, as identified by its CRS identification number and with a strictly positive flow (some 
observations are zeros)
4. By imposing these conditions, we aim to capture flows that correspond 
to projects in the field, and not in the donor country; that represent money available to the 
developing country, and not debt relief that does not represent an actual flow; that are allocated 
to a given country, and not to a whole region; and that are part of a programmable policy within 
a policy agenda, and not disbursed because of an emergency. 
There is massive under-reporting in the data, such that any trend must be interpreted 
with extreme caution. Disbursement data is virtually absent before 1990 and commitment data, 
though available since 1973, is also incomplete in the early years. It is unclear if trends are driven 
by better reporting or indeed reflect changes in aid allocation. To avoid this issue, we focus  
primarily on the last year of available data (2007) and refrain from exploiting time variation.  
                                                       
4   See Appendix for more details about the method we used to count the number of projects. 6 
 
2.  Counting projects 
We start by simply counting the number of aid projects in the world. We find that there 
were 93 517 projects in 2007, based on disbursement data. Because there is under-reporting, this 
is a lower bound. If instead of using CPA we simply refer to ODA projects, we find 132 326 aid 
projects in 2007. It is not surprising that there are more disbursements than commitments as a 
commitment  is  then  usually  disbursed  over  many  years.  The  increase  in  the  number  of  aid 
projects may be entirely driven by better reporting from aid agencies. On the other hand, the 
trend is so remarkable that it seems difficult to completely explain it by improved data collection. 
  The  number  of  aid  projects  is  arguably  a  crude  indicator  of  the  extent  to  which  aid 
allocation is fragmented. An important limitation of counting aid projects is that it does not take 
into  account  when  different  projects  are  inter-related  and  are  therefore  part  of  a  bigger, 
coordinated project. The CRS data does not reflect these subtleties. It is a limitation, but we still 
believe aid project numbers give at least a rough idea of the administrative burden of aid. This 
issue  is  much  less  salient  for  the  fragmentation  index  we  develop  later  on,  as  it  relies  on 
aggregate aid disbursements in sectors, and not on the number of projects. 
 
Figure 1. Number of aid projects, 1973-2007 
 






















































































This large increase in aid projects has been accompanied by a corresponding fall in the 
average project size, as shown on Figure 2. The expansion of partnerships has not been met by a 
similar expansion in aid budgets, resulting in more, but smaller, projects
5.  
 
Figure 2: Average project size, 1990-2007 
 
Source: Authors, 2009, based on OECD DAC databases, 2009. 
 
   
3.  Shifting towards social sectors 
These figures so far show a sharp increase in the number of projects, but we do not know 
if that increase has been equally distributed across sectors. To answer this question, we now plot 
the number of projects in each sector as a percentage of the total number of projects.  
Aid sector definition follows that of DAC. Under-reporting is less of an issue here because 
we are looking at the proportion of projects that goes to a sector. As long as under-reporting is 
identical across sectors, proportions will be correct. Because pre-1990 data for disbursements is 
hardly existent we rely on commitment data to have a more consistent long-term view. 
 
 
Figure 3: Project sector repartition, 1973-2007, commitment data 
                                                       











































































































Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
The historical trend in the aid sector allocations is also instructive. We observe a major 
shift in priorities from Production (agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mining, construction, 
trade, and tourism) and Economic (transport, communication, energy and banking) sectors to 
Social (health, education, population, water supply, government and conflict prevention) sectors. 
Social sectors now represent more than 60% of the total number of projects, up from 30% in the 
1970’s (disbursement data would show a very similar picture).  
A finer breakdown confirms these results. Instead of using broad sectors, sub-categories 
are not aggregated. Social sectors are the seven bottom ones on the picture. The Government & 
civil society and Population sectors have gained the most projects over time. Agriculture and 
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Figure 4. Project subsector repartition, 1973-2007, commitment data 
 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Social sectors have benefited the most from the expansion in project numbers. Looking at 
quantities  committed  or  disbursed,  instead  of  number  of  projects,  would  yield  the  same 
conclusion. The shift in priorities from donor countries towards these sectors also implies that we 
should expect them to be most fragmented.  
 
4.  Making sense of the shift from production to social sectors 
We observe a change in donor countries’ priorities. They used to invest in infrastructure, 
heavy investment, before moving towards social issues. This trend has been observed elsewhere 
(see Easterly 2009). In the early days of aid, the emphasis was on increasing the quantity of 
physical infrastructure. The theoretical rationale behind giving aid to raise the stock of capital 
was  provided  by  the  two-gap  model.  This  model  stated  that  developing  countries  lacked 
investment, and so that aid had to finance large projects (dam, power station, highways, steel 
mills, etc.). However, by the 1990s, donors realised that low maintenance on these large scale 
projects  made  them  ineffective.  The  two-gap  model  also  somehow  came  out  of  fashion,  as 
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recurring  fads  and  fashions  that  are  reflected  by  shifts  in  sector  allocations
6.  Large-scale 
infrastructure and, to a lesser extent agriculture, used to be a primary goal of aid but, in the 
1980s, donors favoured an agenda of structural adjustments and macroeconomic reforms. The 
relative  disappointment  associated  to  this  agenda  led  to  a  focus  on  institutiona l  reform, 
corruption and democracy, as shown by the quick expansion of the Government and Civil 
Society sector. The shift in priorities tends to follow the findings in the academic literature.  
The literature on growth accounting, summarised by Caselli (2005), also established that 
cross-country variations in incomes cannot be explained by differences in factors of productions 
(either physical or human capital). Easterly and Levine (2001) also argue that factor accumulation 
fails to explain growth. On the other hand, institutions have now become a prime candidate to 
explain  why  some  countries  are  richer  than  others.  The  importance  of  institution  quality, 
property rights, and the rule of law was emphasised by North (1991). Acemoglu et al. (2001) also 
initiated a vast literature on the long-term consequences of institutions.  
Similarly, the shift from large-scale projects to social issues may be related to the trend in 
development  economics  from  macro  to  micro  levels  of  analysis.  Field  experiments  are  now 
implemented at the local level all over the world and have shown how some small interventions 
could make a large difference for poverty. This is not to say that aid agencies have adopted the 
same methodological apparatus as researchers to implement and evaluate their interventions 
(see Easterly (2009) for an overview of aid agencies’ policies in light of the academic literature), 
but there is a parallel between both. 
Agriculture has been a victim of the comparative attractiveness of social sectors for aid 
agencies. OECD (2008) argues that transaction costs are lower in social sectors and that funds in 
these sectors are easily channelled through large public sector entities. Moreover, social sector 
aid  leads  to  the  delivery  of  well  identified  basic  services  that  have  a  direct  impact  on 
development  targets  such  as  the  Millennium  Development  Goals.  Easterly  (2009)  notes  that, 
despite  some  clear  successes  in  this  sector,  like  the  Green  Revolution  in  India,  and  the 
recognition that it is important for development, African agricultural aid is widely seen as a 
failure. He also remarks that, as a share of total aid, aid to agriculture has sharply fallen, and that 
the World Bank and USAID have been severely criticised for neglecting the sector. Since in the 
poorest countries virtually everyone works in the agricultural sector, this lack of consideration 
must have been quite damaging. Caselli (2005)  shows that, looking at sectoral data, one of the 
main  reasons  why  poor  countries  are  poor  is  their  much  lower  labour  productivity  in  the 
agricultural sector
7. He quantifies this effect by computing cross-country income differences, had 
all countries had the same agricultural labo ur productivity as the USA. He finds the stunning 
result  that,  under  this  assumption,  world  income  ineq uality  would  virtually  disappear. 
Improvements in agricultural productivity would therefore bring sizable benefits. The small 
number of projects and low stakes in the sector seem to imply that aid donors failed to recognise 
this potential, or at least had other reasons not to exploit it. 
                                                       
6   Frot and Santiso (2009) find evidence that donors herd. This behaviour typically generates fads and 
fashions. 
7   The other two reasons are that they are also less productive in the non-agricultural sectors, and that 
much of their labour force is in the agricultural sector, where labour productivity is lower.  11 
 
The Economist (2009) reported that foreign aid to farming fell dramatically between 1980 
and 2004, but also that public spending was halved in the sector during the same period. The 
neglect of traditional donors and developing countries’ governments has led new donors like 
China  or  oil  exporters  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  invest  in  the  sector.  An  official  at  Sudan’s 
agriculture ministry said investment in farming in his country by Arab states would rise almost 
tenfold from USD 700 million in 2007 to a forecast USD 7.5 billion in 2010, representing half of all 
investment in the country when it was a mere 3% in 2007. These new investors bring with them 
seeds,  marketing  techniques,  jobs,  schools,  clinics  and  roads.  We  do  not  enter  here  into  the 
debate  of  whether  these  investments  will  succeed  where  other  Western  initiatives  failed,  or 
whether aid from ‚new donors‛ carries costs that reduce its value, but it seems that the neglect of 
agriculture by traditional donors has opened up the way for emerging donors in this sector. 
 
III. FRAGMENTATION ON THE DONORS’ SIDE 
In this section we measure donor fragmentation in each sector and assess how much a 
fragmentation measure based on sectors differs from one based on countries. We make use of the 
OECD DAC definition of fragmentation and extend it to sectors. In each recipient-sector-year, 
donors’ shares are computed and compared to donors’ shares in the sector at the global level. If 
the former is smaller than the latter then the partnership is said to be insignificant. Assume for 
instance that Austria provides 2% of total health aid to Vietnam. If Austria provides 5% of global 
health aid then its partnership with Vietnam is considered as fragmented or, in other words, 
insignificant. 
This first measure suffers from a negative bias towards large donors. Small donors’ global 
shares are often so low that they correspond to quite small amounts of money for a recipient. It is 
therefore more often the case that a small donor’s partnership is more significant than that of a 
large donor. Large donors’ portfolios are likely to appear more fragmented because of this bias. 
For this reason OECD DAC also takes into account, as a complementary measure, if the donor is 
among the group of donors that together disburse 90%of total aid to the recipient.  
We later present both measures for each donor but in Table 1 we use only the first one to 
average across donors. Results with the second measure would be very similar. Both definitions 












Table 1. Average fraction of significant partnerships and average aid fraction they receive, 2007, 
disbursement data 
  Fraction of significant 
partnerships 
Fraction of aid that goes to 
significant recipients 
Social sectors     
Education  45  89 
Health  51  88 
Population  61  86 
Water supply and sanitation  62  94 
Government & Civil Society  47  86 
Conflict, Peace & Security  61  88 
Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services  53  90 
     
Economic sectors     
Transport and 
communications 
61  96 
Energy  73  95 
Economic, other  72  95 
     
Production sectors     
Agriculture  57  90 
Industry, mining and 
construction 
68  96 
Trade and tourism  79  97 
     
Multisector  47  87 
     
Programme Assistance  88  97 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Table  1  indicates  which  sectors  are,  on  average,  more  fragmented.  The  first  column 
reports the average fraction, across donors, of significant partnerships in the sector. The second 
column indicates the share of aid that these significant partnerships represent.  
Social sectors are more fragmented, as we expected above. Often fewer than half of all 
partnerships are significant. This is particularly true for the Education sector. This occurs when 
donor countries have many small projects and indicate opportunities to reduce fragmentation. 
The economic and production sectors are less fragmented. The second column shows that even 
when most partnerships are not significant, they still represent a very small aid budget relative 
to  the  total  allocated  to  the  sector.  The  most  fragmented  sector  is  Education,  but  significant 
partnerships still receive 89% of aid. It underlines that non-significant partnerships are under-
funded and involve very tiny amounts. This observation also holds at the recipient level and is a 
constant of aid allocation (see Frot 2009). 
Table 2 presents both fragmentation measures for each donor in social sectors in 2007. 
Columns labelled ‚Global‛ use the definition  of fragmentation based on global shares, those 
labelled ‚Top‛ use the definition based on whether the donor is in the group of largest donors. 13 
 
Fragmentation  numbers  are  sometimes  quite  extreme.  For  instance  only  22%  of  all  Austrian 
partnerships in the Education sector are significant. Only 19% of US partnerships in the water 
supply sector are significant.  The two measures do not necessarily disagree and the bias against 
large donors is not always present. It plays a big role for the United States, by far the largest 
donor, but not necessarily for other large donors (Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France). 
Some  donors  exhibit  a  highly  fragmented  portfolio  according  to  both  measures:  Italy  scores 
badly along both. Table 2 contains summary measures across all recipients and can only identify 
donors  whose  allocations  are  fragmented  on  average  in  a  sector.  It  is  only  a  first  step  in 
providing a detailed picture of fragmentation. Policy recommendations need to be based on the 
fragmentation analysis in each recipient. The matrix of donor-recipient-fragmentation is too large 
to be presented here, but is available on request from the authors. 
A  more  stringent  definition  of  fragmentation  would  classify  partnerships  as  being 
equivalent only when the donor’s share is above its global share and it is among the group of top 
donors. It happens that this measure is always equal to the minimum of the two presented in 
Table 2, so it can be read easily from this table
8.  
   
                                                       
8 Alternatively, one could use a looser definition that considers a partnership to be significant if either the 
share is above the global one or the donor is in the top group of donors. Similarly, this corresponds in 
practice to the maximum of these two measures and so can also be read in Table 2.  14 
 
 
Table 2. Fragmentation in social sectors 2007 
(% projects that are significant relative to all partnerships) 



















































































Australia  43  36  46  41  62  62  46  15  62  69  63  69  62  33 
Austria  22  15  43  2  65  6  52  41  41  11  68  14  49  8 
Belgium  43  25  50  48  41  15  62  38  47  21  74  32  42  19 
Canada  34  31  43  45  58  23  51  26  43  46  79  45  33  23 
Denmark  68  55  41  35  80  15  68  63  63  44  73  53  76  36 
EC  43  56  43  64  54  50  59  71  48  88  59  76  25  71 
Finland  49  19  50  11  57  4  60  27  32  10  67  19  80  11 
France  31  66  68  53  100  29  60  63  42  26  61  47  46  67 
Germany  35  66  28  28  45  45  57  77  46  60  56  59  44  59 
Global Fund      64  91  62  97                 
Greece  35  11  69  3  100  0  63  11  69  15  46  46  60  16 
Ireland  33  16  30  21  36  25  75  21  39  22  73  27  46  29 
Italy  44  7  35  30  55  10  36  13  34  15  53  33  45  23 
Japan  33  58  44  59  65  24  43  70  33  35  82  73  51  53 
Luxembourg  61  18  56  29  72  44  76  35  47  13  64  27  63  13 
Netherlands  64  75  70  65  61  26  73  81  51  51  65  65  57  27 
New Zealand  48  20  88  31  63  25  100  75  80  28  86  57  93  27 
Norway  57  43  48  38  53  26  64  27  44  44  65  81  54  36 
Portugal  20  17  83  67  100  50  100  20  57  36  41  50  29  19 
Spain  47  46  53  49  61  43  63  59  49  51  65  65  62  68 
Sweden  53  34  21  19  31  13  64  40  39  51  49  41  42  35 
Switzerland  40  8  67  47  69  0  45  29  53  24  39  42  55  10 
UNAIDS          65  38                 
UNDP  85  0  69  19  66  15  78  11  64  60  68  26  76  15 
UNFPA          77  82                 
UNICEF  49  17  46  55  59  28  58  22  50  9  46  14  63  47 
United 
Kingdom 
59  59  44  62  35  65  65  65  27  52  44  58  54  50 
United States  38  52  39  74  24  76  19  28  24  75  36  71  31  64 
Average  45  34  51  42  61  33  62  41  47  38  61  48  53  34 
Note: Shaded cells indicate the five most fragmented donors in each sector, according to each measure. 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 15 
 
Evolution over time of fragmentation shows fragmentation has also deteriorated most in 
the Social sectors. To show this, we define broad sector categories and compute the number of 
significant partnerships in each broad category. We then average this number across donors. 
Since 2000, donor countries have had, on average, fewer than 50% of significant partners in the 
Social  sector.  As  already  hinted  above,  higher  fragmentation  in  the  social  sectors  is  to  be 
expected. Donors incur higher fixed costs when entering into large infrastructure projects that 
are found in the economic and production sectors. Dispersion is therefore costly in these sectors. 
On the contrary, social sectors are ideal for local projects with lower fixed costs. The political 
economy of aid, that require aid agencies to show tangible results, puts greater emphasis on 
short-term projects with well-identified outputs that fit better the conditions of social sectors. 
Though these results were expected, they show how organisational incentives have shaped aid 
allocation, with detrimental consequences on its efficiency. 
 
Figure 5. Average donor fragmentation per sector, 1990-2007, disbursement data 
 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Finally, we provide aggregate fragmentation measures for donors. We also quantify to 
what extent a global fragmentation index based on sector differs from one based on countries.  
Using the same fine sector decomposition as above, we compute the fraction of significant 
partnerships in each broad sector. In other words, for each donor we count the number of its 
significant  partnerships  in  all  subsectors  of  the  social  sector  (education,  health,  etc)  and  we 
divide this number by the total number of partnerships in the social sector that involves this 












Social Economic Production Multisector Programme Assistance16 
 
sector.  We  also  define  a  global  donor  fragmentation  index  as  the  fraction  of  significant 
partnerships across all sectors. 
The indexes are presented for year 2007 in Table 3. They indicate which donors have the 
most fragmented portfolios in each sector. The global donor index is not based on the sector 
figures,  but  on  a  finer  decomposition  of  subsectors  (the  social  sector  is  decomposed  into 
education, health, population, etc.).  
Sector indexes confirm the higher fragmentation of the social sectors, according to both 
measures, and which donors are the most fragmented. The United States often have the most 
fragmented allocation. A possible explanation is that this donor usually disburses a very large 
share of its aid to a handful of countries. Its other recipients therefore appear as insignificant, 
even though the United States are still an important donor for them. 
An alternative global index is to consider recipient countries instead of recipient-sectors. 
This decomposition was the first used by OECD (2008) and Frot (2009). Using the same CRS data, 
the last column of the table presents a fragmentation index that is the proportion of significant 
recipients for each donor. The global index based on sectors is almost always much higher than 
when it is based on countries. It shows donors tend to specialise. Their aid share in the recipient 
may be low, and so the recipient is counted as insignificant, but their aid share in a sector in the 
same  recipient  may  be  very  high,  and  the  recipient-sector  is  counted  as  significant. 
Fragmentation is over-estimated by looking at aggregate country data. It shows that taking into 
account the sectoral nature of aid matters significantly in measuring fragmentation. This is true 
for the first definition of fragmentation, based on global shares, but less for the second definition. 
The ‚top‛ fragmentation measures for country-sectors and countries are quite close, except for 
the largest donors, whose fragmentation appears to be much lower with the country index.One 
could also argue that the country-sector index underestimates fragmentation because it does not 
take into account that sectors are in a same country. The country-sector index is neutral with 
respect to recipients whereas a portfolio where significant sectors are grouped in a few recipients 
could be considered to be less fragmented than when they are dispersed over many recipients
9.  
   
                                                       
9   It is possible to modify the index to take into account the fact that sectors are in the same or different 
countries. However this degree of substitutability between country-sectors must be arbitrarily imposed 
and  here  we  limit  ourselves  to  the  simple  case  where  country-sectors  contribute  equally  to  the 
fragmentation index regardless of their being in the same or different countries.   17 
 
 
Table 3. Donor fragmentation index, 2007 
 
































































Australia  53  47  61  44  38  49  56  40  75  50  52  24  26  27 
Austria  41  13  80  29  59  8  69  23 
    50  9  27  11 
Belgium  49  27  59  28  49  29  60  40  50  0  52  17  29  17 
Canada  46  36  50  31  59  17  41  32  75  50  47  19  29  28 
Denmark  67  43  64  56  67  48  73  70  80  60  68  25  41  36 
EC  45  70  68  74  46  76  54  82  82  97  51  37  50  87 
Finland  51  13  77  20  42  20  64  29  100  0  54  9  27  5 
France  47  55  73  66  36  54  55  68  92  83  49  36  34  53 
Germany  43  58  45  60  43  71  54  54  89  56  46  32  39  74 
Global Fund  63  94 
                63  94  53  62 
Greece  51  13  92  15  55  9  94  35 
    57  8  26  4 
Ireland  41  21  85  11  36  17  72  38  100  50  48  15  29  14 
Italy  41  18  67  42  51  22  55  34  60  40  47  11  28  20 
Japan  44  53  47  57  19  39  48  66  75  100  44  25  23  71 
Luxembourg  60  23  92  29  65  19  71  32 
    65  16  39  13 
Netherlands  61  55  62  40  45  60  67  52  81  100  61  27  35  41 
New Zealand  68  28  87  70  59  19  82  42  100  100  71  17  32  15 
Norway  54  44  64  41  43  50  55  38  100  100  55  26  31  33 
Portugal  39  30  88  56  70  70  100  38  100  0  52  22  22  16 
Spain  55  53  59  40  54  62  62  54  100  90  57  31  38  45 
Sweden  39  33  47  29  33  28  71  58  100  100  42  21  39  38 
Switzerland  50  22  79  38  36  21  66  43  100  33  53  12  32  18 
UNAIDS  65  38 
                65  38  54  2 
UNDP  68  35  77  37  56  47  77  42 
    67  19  60  20 
UNFPA  77  82 
                77  82  62  5 
UNICEF  53  29 
   
45  26 
        52  25  48  28 
United 
Kingdom 
42  57  67  52  27  33  57  62  100  100  46  35  25  43 
United States  30  67  27  54  38  74  29  51  100  100  31  36  30  75 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
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IV. FRAGMENTATION ON RECIPIENTS’ SIDE 
1.  Counting projects 
We first list in Table 4 the top 10 recipients with the largest number of projects, in total, 
and then in broad sectors in 2007, before computing a precise fragmentation index (the full list is 
in the Appendix). Countries with the largest number of projects have more than 2000 in a single 
year. Iraq alone has more than 4 000 aid projects running in a single year, doubling the amount of 
other countries. Large countries like India, Indonesia and China had more than 2 000 aid projects 
in 2007 but so did smaller countries like Uganda, Mozambique or Zambia.  
All in all, 601 aid projects run simultaneously in the average recipient (the median is 434). 
Similarly, a single sector easily accommodates 400 aid projects. However the distribution is quite 
skewed with on average 44 projects in a recipient-sector. The median is 19 projects in a recipient-
sector.  It  indicates  that  some  sectors  in  some  countries  attract  disproportionate  quantities  of 
projects, whereas others might actually suffer from too low donors’ attention. 
 
Table 4. Top ten countries for number of aid projects, 2007, disbursement data 
Recipient  Number of aid projects 
Iraq  4162 
Mozambique  2409 
India  2122 
Uganda  2110 
China  2106 
Zambia  2105 
Indonesia  2039 
Ethiopia  1840 
Viet Nam  1763 
Tanzania  1601 
World average  601 
World median  434 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
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Table 5. Top ten country-sectors for number of aid projects (Iraq excluded), 2007, disbursement 
data 
Recipient  Sector  Number of aid projects 
Mozambique  Multisector  949 
Uganda  Government & Civil Society  555 
Serbia  Government & Civil Society  492 
Uganda  Education  467 
Zambia  Water supply and sanitation  429 
Indonesia  Government & Civil Society  427 
China  Multisector  425 
India  Government & Civil Society  418 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  Government & Civil Society  411 
Zambia  Government & Civil Society  386 
World average    44 
World median    19 
Note: The world average includes Iraq. 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
In  some  countries  lots  of  aid  projects  sometimes  coexist.  On  the  other  hand,  many 
countries have much fewer. Fragmentation is not only about too many projects in a country, but 
also about disparities across countries, with some attracting a large share of projects. 
 
2.  Fragmentation  
OECD DAC measures fragmentation in recipients as the number of donors that account 
for  less  than  10%  of  total  aid.  We  use  this  definition  here  and  report  the  most  fragmented 
recipient-sectors in 2007. The maximum number of donor countries is 28. For each recipient-
sector, we also report the number of donors that were operating. It is usually the case in the most 
fragmented sectors that a very high proportion of donors represent less than 10% of disbursed 
aid. The most fragmented sectors all are social sectors.  
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Table 6. Number of donors disbursing less than 10% of aid, 2007 disbursement data 
Recipient  Sector  Number of donors 




China  Education  20  23 
Ethiopia  Other Social 
Infrastructure & Services 




Infrastructure & Services 
19  20 
South Africa  Population  18  23 
India  Education  18  23 
Colombia  Other Social 
Infrastructure & Services 
17  19 
Kenya  Population  17  19 
Afghanistan  Other Social 
Infrastructure & Services 
17  21 
Uganda  Population  16  20 
Indonesia  Education  16  21 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Table 5 and Table 6 look at the most fragmented country-sectors. In order to find which 
sectors are most fragmented from a recipient point of view, we compute in Table 7 the averages, 
across  recipients  in  2007,  of  number  of  donors  and  number  or  proportion  of  donors  that 
collectively represent less than 10% of aid. The education sector is the most fragmented with on 
average 10 donors and 56% of them disbursing collectively less than 10% of aid. Social sectors are 
the most fragmented. They have the largest number of donors and the largest proportion of 
donors disbursing small quantities. 
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Table 7. Recipient fragmentation, 2007 
Sector  Number of donors  Number of donors 
that collectively 
represent less than 
10% of aid 
Proportion of donors 
that collectively 
represent less than 
10% of aid 
       
Social sectors       
Education  12  7  60 
Health  10  5  46 
Population  9  5  47 
Water supply and 
sanitation  6  3  40 
Government & Civil 
Society  12  7  50 
Conflict, Peace & 
Security  7  4  43 
Other Social 
Infrastructure & 
Services  10  6  50 
       
Economic sectors       
Transport and 
communications  5  3  45 
Energy  4  2  35 
Economic, other  6  3  38 
       
Production sectors       
Agriculture  7  4  41 
Industry, mining and 
construction  5  2  35 
Trade and tourism  4  2  32 
       
Multisector  12  7  54 
       
Programme assistance  3  1  11 






3.  Monopoly index 
However, as already remarked by OECD DAC (2008), fragmentation is not always about 
too  much  fragmentation,  but  also  about  not  enough.  Too  many  donors  in  one  sector  create 
transaction costs that decrease aid efficiency, but not enough competition among donors is also 
an issue. A donor enjoying a monopoly in a sector may be more at ease to impose its contractors, 
to tie aid, etc. Competition between donors is usually weak in aid allocation, even when many 
are present, and a too low fragmentation (i.e. a monopoly) reinforces this effect.  
Our concept of donor monopoly power aggregates up sectors within a country. A donor 
is said to be in a monopoly position when it represents a large share of aid disbursed in each 
sector it is present, and when it is present in many sectors. We define a monopoly index that 
takes these two dimensions into account. Donor i disburses aijs to country j in sector s. Let Sij be 
the number of sectors in country j where donor i is active, and Sj the number of sectors in country 
j that receive aid from any donor. The index Mij is the product of the average sector share of 
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It is equivalent to the average donor share, when all the sectors are taken into account 
(with  sectors  where  the  donor  is  not  present  with  a  zero  disbursement),  but  we  think  the 
interpretation above captures well the intuition behind the index. Mij is large when the donor is 
present in many sectors and dominates many of them. Its maximum is 1, and it is reached when 
only one donor is present in a country. 
Mij  weighs  equally  each  sector.  However,  sectors  receive  different  aid  quantities  and 
monopoly  power  is reinforced  when  a  donor  is  dominant  in  the  most important sectors. To 
capture this dimension, we define a weighted index Wij. It is defined similarly to Mij but each 
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Wij is large when the donor is present in many sectors, and is dominant in dominant 
sectors.  Its  maximum  value  is  also  1.  The  unweighted  and  weighted  indexes  are  highly 
correlated (correlation is 0.95) although in some cases they diverge. That occurs for instance 
when a donor disburses aid in many sectors, but only small quantities in the well-endowed 
sectors, or when a donor targets a few sectors with very large disbursements, but spends nothing 
in other sectors where other donors disburse moderate amounts of cash. Though no index is 
strictly better than the other, the weighted index has the advantage of being influenced by aid 
quantities, and not only shares in sectors.  
These two indexes are useful to identify developing countries that are heavily dependent 
on a donor. Note that our approach is more complex than a single look at donors’ aid shares for 
each country because it takes into account that aid is spent in different sectors.  Monopoly power 
is stronger when a donor is present in many sectors. It is also revealed when a donor takes a 
comprehensive approach to the partnership by being the dominant player in most sectors. This 
characteristic is not captured by an index based on disbursements at the country level. 23 
 
In Table 8 we present countries that constitute the top 5% of the distribution of each index 
in  2007.  For  each  recipient,  we  also  indicate  the  donor  that  dominates.  Countries  with  the 
strongest donor monopoly are first island states, usually former colonies sometimes still officially 
linked to the former colonial power.  
The unweighted index also reveals the predominance of Japan in the Pacific area. Apart 
from these small island states, the unweighted index also identifies Iraq, Malaysia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Turkmenistan, Gabon and Iran as aid recipients with one dominant donor. The weighted 
index confirms these cases and reveals new ones: Kazakhstan, Colombia, Egypt, Jordan, Croatia, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Turkey, China and Liberia. 
Donors with monopoly power are those with the largest aid budgets, apart from New 
Zealand, and, to a lesser extent, Australia and Spain. However Germany, whose aid budget is 
similar to the French budget, is not in the list.  
For all the countries listed, the concern is more about too few donors than too many. 
There  is  no  general  rule  to  indicate  the  optimal  number  of  donors  given  the  recipient’s 
characteristics, but too little competition is not beneficial either. The point here is not to precisely 
identify the right balance between monopoly power and fragmentation, but more to emphasise 
that some countries have too few donors. 
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Table 8. Monopoly index, top 5% highest values, 2007 
Recipient  Donor  Mij    Recipient  Donor  Wij 
Anguilla  United Kingdom  1    Anguilla  United Kingdom  1 
Mayotte  France  0.98    Wallis & Futuna  France  1 
St. Helena  United Kingdom  0.96    Mayotte  France  1 
Wallis & Futuna  France  0.92    St. Helena  United Kingdom  0.92 
Montserrat  United Kingdom  0.84    Montserrat  United Kingdom  0.89 
Iraq  United States  0.81    Niue  New Zealand  0.84 
Tokelau  New Zealand  0.81    Iraq  United States  0.84 
Niue  New Zealand  0.78    Tokelau  New Zealand  0.84 
Turks and Caicos Islands  United Kingdom  0.75    Malaysia  Japan  0.79 
Palau  Japan  0.75   
Papua New 
Guinea 
Australia  0.70 
Suriname  Netherlands  0.62    Suriname  Netherlands  0.69 
Malaysia  Japan  0.61    Dominica  EC  0.62 
Dominica  EC  0.59    Kazakhstan  United States  0.59 
Papua New Guinea  Australia  0.56    Nauru  Australia  0.56 
Cook Islands  New Zealand  0.56    Philippines  Japan  0.54 
Nauru  Australia  0.56    Equatorial Guinea  Spain  0.54 
Saudi Arabia  Japan  0.55    Cook Islands  New Zealand  0.52 
Mauritius  France  0.52    Colombia  United States  0.51 
Marshall Islands  Japan  0.51    Gabon  France  0.51 
Tuvalu  Japan  0.50    Egypt  United States  0.50 
Micronesia, Fed. States  Japan  0.50    Jordan  United States  0.50 
Equatorial Guinea  Spain  0.48    Croatia  EC  0.50 
Oman  Japan  0.48    Solomon Islands  Australia  0.49 
Comoros  France  0.47    Afghanistan  United States  0.47 
Myanmar  Japan  0.47   
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
EC  0.47 
Samoa  Japan  0.46    Indonesia  Japan  0.46 
Turkmenistan  United States  0.45    Turkey  EC  0.43 
Gabon  France  0.45    Mauritius  France  0.43 
St.Vincent & Grenadines  Japan  0.43    Turkmenistan  United States  0.42 
Iran  Japan  0.42    China  Japan  0.40 
Kiribati  Japan  0.42    Liberia  United States  0.40 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
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4.  How to summarise recipient fragmentation: a graphical tool 
The  sector  decomposition  allows  further  comparisons  between  recipients  and  across 
sectors  within  recipients.  Tanzania  is  known  to  have  a  highly  fragmented  aid  allocation. 
According  to  the  World  Bank  aid  to  Tanzania  is  disbursed  through  more  than  700  projects 
managed by 56 parallel implementation units
10. Tanzania received 541 donor missions during 
2005 of which only 17% involved more than one donor. 
Frot and Santiso (2008) confirm, using a Hirshman -Herfindahl index, that Tanzania has 
one of the most fragmented aid portfolios when one looks at the total aid donor allocations. They 
also find that it has been the case for many years though the situation slightly improved after the 
Tanzanian government took some preventive actions. Sector data also confirm that Tanzania has, 
on average, a fragmented aid allocation.  
To illustrate graphically this property, we construct a ‚radar‛ plot with the total number 
of donors active in the sector, and the number of donors that collectively represent less than 10% 
of total aid disbursed in the sector. 
 
Figure 6. Fragmentation, Tanzania, 2007, disbursement data 
 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
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The  graph  indicates  which  sectors  attract  most  aid  donors.  As  already  shown,  social 
sectors concentrate the majority of donors. Production and infrastructure sectors receive little 
attention. The interior line gives the number of donors that represent less than 10% of total aid. 
Fragmentation  is  severe  when  there  are lots  of  donors  in  a  sector  and  many  disburse  small 
quantities. For instance the education sector is quite fragmented. On the other hand, 75% (3 out 
of  4)  of  the  donors  collectively  disburse  less  than  10%  of  total  aid  in  the  transport  and 
communications  sector. This  proportion  is  high,  but  given that  there  are  only  4  donors,  one 
cannot really say that aid to the sector is very fragmented. 
Tanzania  is,  among  others,  an  aid  darling.  For  aid  orphans,  the  radar  plot  is  quite 
dissimilar. As an example, consider the case of Belize. The radius of the radar plot is the same as 
for Tanzania. Belize has very few donors in each sector. This is only revealed by a sector analysis: 
if  we  count  total  disbursements  to  Belize,  we  find  16  donor  countries.  Many  sectors  do  not 
receive any attention at all.  
 
Figure 7. Fragmentation, Belize, 2007, disbursement data 
 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
We use Papua New Guinea as a final example. According to Table 8, Australia enjoys a 
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very close, especially in sectors with many donors. Australia is the dominant donor in most 
sectors  and  sometimes  even  represents  more  than  90%  of  total  aid  (for  instance  in  the 
Government & Civil Society sector, Australian aid is USD 92 million and total aid to the sector is 
USD 99 million; the second biggest donor in the sector, New Zealand, disburses USD 3.3 million). 
 
Figure 8. Fragmentation, Papua New Guinea, 2007, disbursement data 
 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Radar  plots  offer  a  simple  approach  to  visualise  the  multi-dimensionality  of 
fragmentation within a recipient. They provide a quick and easy way to compare sectors in a 
country, sectors across countries, or countries defined by their whole set of sectors. 
 
5.  A world map of fragmentation 
Finally, we present maps of fragmentation in the education and energy sectors, using the 
number  of  donors  that  collectively  represent  less  than  10%  of  total  aid  as  an  indicator  of 
fragmentation. The same colours are used on both maps. The darker the colour, the higher the 
fragmentation. Fragmentation in the education sector is severe in many countries, but never in 
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Figure 9. Recipient fragmentation in the education (top) and energy (bottom) sectors, 






Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 29 
 
V. RECIPIENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS 
Even  though  the  literature  on  fragmentation  is  rapidly  expanding,  relatively  little  is 
known about what, on average, is correlated with fragmentation. Is it, for instance, that poor 
countries suffer more from fragmentation? In this section we give a first answer to this type of 
question  by  examining  which  country  characteristics  are  correlated  with  fragmentation.  We 
specifically test the influence of three variables: GDP per capita, population and democracy.  
Using OLS regressions including sector and year fixed effects, we check the influence of 
these  variables  on  the  recipient  fragmentation  measure  (number  of  donors  representing 
collectively less than 10% of total aid).  
GDP per capita, in thousands of 2000 constant USD, and population data, in millions, 
come  from  the  World  Development  Indicators.  Democracy  level  is  proxied  by  the  polity2 
variable of the Polity IV dataset. We must underline that in using these simple regressions, we do 
not claim to find any causality effect. We are simply measuring correlations to understand which 
countries have the most fragmented aid. The basic specification is the following: 
𝑓 ??? = ?𝐺𝐷??? + ?????? + ????𝐼?𝑌2?? + ?? + 𝜇? + 𝜖??? 
where fist is fragmentation in sector s of country i in year t, GDPit is country i income per 
capita in year t, POPit is its population, POLITY2it is its democracy score, δt is a year fixed effect, 
µs is a sector fixed effect, and εist is an error term. 
We first use all available years and simply include the three variables. Column (1) shows 
the  results.  Rich  countries  receive  less  fragmented  sector  aid,  while  large  and  democratic 
countries receive more fragmented sector aid. In column (2) we interact the polity2 variable with 
sector dummies to evaluate the effect of democracy in each separate sector. The interaction term 
is positive and significant in most sectors. It reaches a maximum in the government and civil 
society sector, suggesting that donors tend to herd towards more democratic countries in this 
sector,  where  institutions  may  have  a  more  direct  effect  than  in  other  sectors.  Programme 
assistance  is  actually  less  fragmented  in  more  democratic  countries,  which  may  come  as  a 
surprise.  
The fragmentation measure depends on the number of donors present in the country. Its 
lower bound is 0 if between 1 and 9 donors disburse aid to the sector, 1 if there are between 10 
and 19, 2 between 20 and 29, and so on. Given this automatic relationship between fragmentation 
and number of donors, we include the latter in columns (3) and (4). We now find no effect of 
democracy on fragmentation, and a positive effect of GDP.  
How shall we interpret these results? Columns (1) and (2) show that if we compare two 
countries, then the most democratic of the two has, on average, more fragmented aid. Columns 
(3) and (4) show that this is actually due to the fact that the most democratic country attracts 
more donors: if we compare two countries with the same number of donors, then regardless of 
their democracy scores, their fragmentation levels are identical.  
The positive effect of GDP in columns (3) and (4) show that if we compare two countries 
with the same number of donors, then the richest one has a higher fragmentation measure. The 
interpretation here is that rich countries attract fewer donors, so that on average their aid is less 30 
 
fragmented, but that, for a given number of donors, they actually are more fragmented than 
poorer countries.   
Table 9. Country-sector fragmentation determinants 
  All years    After 2003 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
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Observations  23772  23772  23772  23772    7692  7692  7692  7692 
R2  0.387  0.528  0.910  0.912    0.129  0.511  0.890  0.897 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Sector and year fixed effects included in all the 
regressions. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: Authors calculations, 2009, based on OECD DAC data, 2009. 
Early years often contain patchy data and their reliability is questionable. For this reason 
in columns (5) to (8) we repeat the same estimations but using only the last five years of the 
dataset, from 2003 to 2007.  
Results are quite similar, with usually larger coefficients. Despite statistical significance 
for most variables, effects are relatively limited. GDP per capita is expressed in thousands of 
dollars, so even a large change in income hardly affects fragmentation (the standard deviation of 
GDP in the sample is 2.08, its mean is 1.6). The same is true for population, expressed in millions, 
and with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 167. The effect of democracy is also small: a 
one standard deviation change of 6.4 increases fragmentation by 0.2 (using column (1) estimates). 
The  standard  deviation  of  fragmentation  in  the  sample  is  2.8.  For  all  these  variables,  large 
changes  do  not  really  have  important  consequences  on  fragmentation.  Finally,  one  more 
additional donor increases fragmentation by 0.6, on average. So for three additional donors, two 
go to the group of ‚small‛ donors (that represents less than 10% of total aid).  
The same result was found by Frot and Santiso (2008) using country data instead of sector 
data, and so it seems to be quite general. It implies that an increase in the number of donors 
quickly creates fragmentation. In this regard, the quick expansion in the number of aid donors 
and the expansion of their portfolios directly feeds into fragmentation.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In  documenting  aid  fragmentation  at  the  sector  level,  this  paper  complements  earlier 
studies that either stayed at the country level or were limited to a few sectors. The paper’s first 
contribution is in the use of sector data for all DAC donors, sectors and years, with a view to 
providing as complete a picture as possible, given data limitation. Second, it emphasises that 
many sectors receive very little attention and that this creates ‚aid monopolies‛. An index has 
been created that identifies critical cases. It is a first contribution to quantifying this problem. 
Third, the paper provides an estimation of the country determinants of fragmentation.  
It is found that sector decomposition proves useful in understanding where coordination 
efforts among donors are needed, with education and government sectors being conspicuous 
candidates. It is also argued that results can be quite different when one aggregates aid across all 
sectors or keeps them separated. The shift in aid priorities documented in this paper may well 
have  been  justified,  but  it  may  also  have  been  excessive,  particularly  regarding  agriculture. 
Neglected sectors today attract new donors that are happy to compensate for the lack of funds 
from more traditional Western donors. This is good news if these sectors were indeed cash-
starved but it will also add to an already overcrowded aid environment. Unfortunately we can 
say  nothing  about  this using current  available data.  If, first all  OECD countries, and second 
‚new‛ donors, were to provide accurate sector data, we would have a much more complete 
picture  of  fragmentation.  A  first  policy  recommendation  would  therefore  be  to  invite  these 
countries to do so, and to join the DAC donors in their effort to tackle fragmentation. 
Fragmentation  is  a  many-faceted  issue.  Some  countries  and  sectors  suffer  from  very 
fragmented aid allocations but, at the same time, some experience the opposite situation. And 
within  countries,  sectors  are  treated  differentially.  A  country  aid  allocation  may  not  appear 
overall as being particularly fragmented when in fact, some sectors are overwhelmed by projects 
and  others  are  dominated  by  one  or  two  donors.  This  complex  pattern  calls  for  a  careful 
approach to fragmentation that takes into account the particularities of each case. The diagnosis 
of the problem might be the easiest part of the issue. Solving it or helping to solve it is a very 
different story. The discrepancies across sectors already suggest a more coordinated approach in 
the donor community to designing a better labour division, with donors focusing on their key 
partnerships and leaving those where they have little interest. This reform, already described by 
Frot (2009) at the country level, can be replicated with country-sectors. He showed that a reform 
that would leave aid budgets and receipts unchanged, but that would reshuffle around 20% of 
current disbursements, would dramatically reduce fragmentation. Aid fragmentation relies on an 
actually small number of underfunded partnerships and this paper has confirmed that it was 
also the case at the sector level. As a consequence, even limited action could have an important 
impact  on  fragmentation.  The  measures  developed  in  this  paper  will  help  to  design  further 
policy recommendations in future research. By combining cross-country and in-country division 
of labour we can start drawing the contours of a more efficient aid allocation, keeping constant 
aid quantities and getting donors to focus on their most important partnerships.  
However, such a reform keeps aid quantities constant for each recipient and reduces the 
number  of  donors  in  every  country.  This  approach  is  usually  the  one  advocated  in 
fragmentation-reducing policy papers, such as OECD DAC (2009). Our results emphasised that 33 
 
too little fragmentation, or rather too little competition, may also be an issue in many countries. 
There  is  a  real  tension  between  reducing  fragmentation  and  avoiding  the  creation  of  aid 
monopolies. As Rogerson and Steensen (2009b) similarly argued, the pressure on donors to focus 
on fewer countries runs the risk of creating new aid orphans. But in addition to this issue, we 
stress here that the fall in competition may not be beneficial everywhere. The Paris Declaration 
and the Accra Agenda for Action strive to define a set of recommendations to make aid more 
efficient but could be complemented by a debate about the ‚right‛ level of fragmentation that 
would avoid monopolies and excessive superimposition of donors. 
The OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness is following progress on a set of key 
tasks  defined  by  the  Accra  Agenda  for  Action.  It  has  a  critical  role  in  monitoring  donors’ 
commitments to improve aid efficiency. It recognises that dealing with division of labour and 
fragmentation also involves focusing on countries receiving insufficient aid. As shown in this 
paper, in addition to insufficient aid, too little competition is another aspect of the problem that 
should enter any discussion on fragmentation. Future work will shed more light on this topic. 
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APPENDIX 
Definition of an aid project 
The CRS database attributes an identification number to each aid activity (variable crsid 
in the dataset). This number alone almost perfectly identifies different aid activities. Though it is 
not  usually  the  case,  two  different  projects  from  two  different  donors  may  have  the  same 
identification number. On the other hand, two different projects from the same donor never have 
the same identification number
11. Thanks to this, we are able to count the number of projects by 
first counting projects for each donor and then adding these numbers across donors. Finally, 
some projects are reported in the dataset but with a transfer of 0 dollars. These are not counted as 
active projects. If these should actually be counted, then our results underestimate the real 
number of projects. 
 
Complement to Table 1, with both measures of donor fragmentation 
The ‚above global share‛ column replicates Table 1. The ‚top donors‛ column defines a 
partnership to be significant if the donor is in the group of donors that collectively disburse 90 
%of the total aid to the recipient. Note that both measures are very highly correlated. Remember 
that a more stringent definition requiring both criteria to be satisfied in order for a partnership to 
be classified as significant would be almost equivalent to picking up the lowest fragmentation 
figure of the two proposed here. 
   
                                                       
11   This is almost always true. It sometimes happens that two activities from the same donor receive the 
same number. However these are usually closely related, by being in the same sector for instance. If 




  Fraction of significant 
partnerships 









Social sectors         
Education  45  34  89  76 
Health  51  42  88  78 
Population  61  33  86  59 
Water supply and sanitation  62  41  94  75 
Government & Civil Society  47  38  86  77 
Conflict, Peace & Security  61  48  88  75 
Other Social Infrastructure & 
Services  53  34  90  73 
         
Economic sectors         
Transport and communications  61  35  96  76 
Energy  73  46  95  77 
Economic, other  72  48  95  71 
         
Production sectors         
Agriculture  57  43  90  76 
Industry, mining and 
construction 
68  46  96  77 
Trade and tourism  79  48  97  73 
         
Multisector  47  39  87  78 
         
Programme Assistance  88  65  97  72 
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Large donors run the largest number of projects but some, like France and the United Kingdom, 
despite disbursing large aid quantities, have fewer partnerships than many smaller donors.  
Number of projects in each country, 2007, disbursement data 
 
Country  Number of aid 
projects 
  Country  Number of aid 
projects 
Afghanistan  1257    Malaysia  258 
Albania  978    Maldives  104 
Algeria  349    Mali  1006 
Angola  665    Marshall Islands  44 
Anguilla  9    Mauritania  364 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
20    Mauritius  95 
Argentina  654    Mayotte  28 
Armenia  541    Mexico  735 
Azerbaijan  375    Micronesia, Fed. States  64 
Bangladesh  1117    Moldova  539 
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Belarus  336    Montenegro  299 
Belize  77    Montserrat  49 
Benin  652    Morocco  995 
Bhutan  255    Mozambique  2409 
Bolivia  1468    Myanmar  395 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  1192    Namibia  505 
Botswana  237    Nauru  80 
Brazil  1464    Nepal  1062 
Burkina Faso  851    Nicaragua  1230 
Burundi  501    Niger  595 
Cambodia  1106    Nigeria  969 
Cameroon  522    Niue  46 
Cape Verde  327    Oman  42 
Central African Rep.  208    Pakistan  955 
Chad  339    Palau  44 
Chile  443    Palestinian Adm. Areas  1187 
China  2106    Panama  266 
Colombia  1096    Papua New Guinea  949 
Comoros  111    Paraguay  439 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  1188    Peru  1483 
Congo, Rep.  222    Philippines  1430 
Cook Islands  58    Rwanda  816 
Costa Rica  303    Samoa  212 
Cote d'Ivoire  330    Sao Tome & Principe  194 
Croatia  421    Saudi Arabia  58 
Cuba  415    Senegal  928 
Djibouti  133    Serbia  1396 
Dominica  37    Seychelles  34 
Dominican Republic  521    Sierra Leone  410 
Ecuador  907    Solomon Islands  431 
Egypt  952    Somalia  340 
El Salvador  715    South Africa  1403 
Equatorial Guinea  118    Sri Lanka  885 
Eritrea  256    St. Helena  55 
Ethiopia  1840    St. Kitts-Nevis  11 
Fiji  296    St. Lucia  44 
Gabon  156    St.Vincent & 
Grenadines 
27 
Gambia  222    States Ex-Yugoslavia  146 
Georgia  613    Sudan  977 
Ghana  882    Suriname  87 
Grenada  19    Swaziland  173 
Guatemala  1122    Syria  363 38 
 
Guinea  382    Tajikistan  456 
Guinea-Bissau  282    Tanzania  1601 
Guyana  197    Thailand  600 
Haiti  688    Timor-Leste  719 
Honduras  737    Togo  328 
India  2122    Tokelau  13 
Indonesia  2039    Tonga  179 
Iran  225    Trinidad and Tobago  77 
Iraq  4162    Tunisia  444 
Jamaica  271    Turkey  464 
Jordan  500    Turkmenistan  167 
Kazakhstan  512    Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
9 
Kenya  1537    Tuvalu  50 
Kiribati  141    Uganda  2110 
Korea, Dem. Rep.  129    Ukraine  1007 
Kyrgyz Republic  562    Uruguay  287 
Laos  708    Uzbekistan  437 
Lebanon  511    Vanuatu  306 
Lesotho  265    Venezuela  381 
Liberia  480    Viet Nam  1763 
Libya  60    Wallis & Futuna  21 
Macedonia, FYR  613    Yemen  486 
Madagascar  583    Zambia  2105 
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